

The Reality of German Development Policy

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PREFACE

This is the 26th time that Welthungerhilfe and terre des hommes Germany are publishing their report on the reality of German development policy. Compass 2019 offers an analysis of the latest data on public expenditure for development cooperation as well as a critical assessment of two current topics: the German Federal Government's Africa policy and its strategy for protecting children during armed conflict.

The Federal Government is a key actor that has the ability to improve living conditions for many people around the world through development cooperation and coherent political action as set out in Agenda 2030. It has just ten years left to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals on schedule, and progress is currently being hamstrung by insufficient ambition and vision along with far too little emphasis on long-term and sustainable solutions in governance.

Despite the fact that development cooperation is now more important than ever, it cannot overcome today's global challenges on its own. Commercial, economic, domestic, and security policies must be firmly aligned with Agenda 2030 and human rights standards. In the much-needed debate about the role, organisation, and strategies of development cooperation in the context of current global challenges, Compass 2019 offers a critical voice from the perspective of civil society.

Berlin, Bonn, and Osnabrück, April 2019

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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

— Observing International ODA Obligations

Greater ambition will be required if the UN's Agenda 2030 development goals are to be achieved and the "leave no-one behind" principle is to be upheld. The Federal Government needs to meet its international obligations and set aside 0.7 percent of the GNP for ODA, with at least 0.2 percent of GNP going to the least-developed countries. It should develop a binding, step-by-step plan for meeting this voluntary commitment in the medium term.

— An Explicit Focus on Fighting Hunger and Poverty

It is time to scale up the fight against hunger and poverty. The One World – No Hunger special initiative launched by BMZ (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) must be institutionally extended

beyond the current legislative period, and funds for fighting hunger and poverty have to be increased in the long term. Programmes need to place greater emphasis on vulnerable demographics while reinforcing rural economic development and sustainable, innovative agriculture.

— Reinforcing Human Rights-based Instruments

A coherent federal development policy should focus more on human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights as well as the human right to food. Programmes for implementing the Voluntary Guidelines with regard to the right to food and the responsible management of land-use rights need to be expanded. The Committee on World Food Security (CFS), which serves as the central committee for developing and consulting on food policy, must be strengthened both institutionally and financially.

— Applying ODA Markers for Food and Nutrition Security

In 2018, the OECD standardised the way in which expenditure for the fight against hunger and malnutrition is recorded. The Federal Government must apply this nutrition policy marker in the next ODA report. In addition, reporting practices that conform to the standards of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) must be expanded to include all ministries that provide ODA.

— Improving Conflict and Disaster Prevention

Funds for civil conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction should be increased, especially in fragile countries. Prevention and resilience building should form part of all humanitarian and development aid programmes in particularly vulnerable regions. Germany should also provide more political support for early conflict solutions within the UN Security Council.

— Creating Political and Financial Freedom for Civil Society Organisations

The fight against hunger and poverty calls for civil society organisations that can effectively represent the interests of the people affected in the political arena. Despite this need, the political and legal spheres of action of such organisations are diminishing in many countries. The Federal Government must implement an interdepartmental strategy to counteract the erosion of their influence. At the same time, funding for the development aid efforts of civil society organisations must be increased and restructured in a more flexible and sustainable way.

— Compelling Companies and Development Banks to Observe Human Rights

The Federal Government must issue a binding resolution to ensure that companies respect human rights at every link of the supply chain. Human rights regulations must be adapted to encompass foreign business transactions conducted by development banks. In addition, there needs to be more monitoring to ensure that social, ecological, and human rights standards are observed during public procurement procedures.

— Building on African Initiatives

Germany's Africa policy requires partnership-based approaches to account for political and economic differentiation throughout the African continent. The Federal Government must offer more concrete measures through which to build on and promote the im-

plementation of the African Union's initiatives and commitments as well as its Agenda 2063 plan. At the same time, it needs to call on its African partners to promote participation by civil society.

— Refraining from Subordinating Development Policy to Migration Reduction

Development, migration, and security policy are threatening to coalesce as part of the effort to address the root causes of refugee displacement. Development assistance should not be weaponised for use in domestic politics, nor should border protection measures be labelled as development assistance. ODA cannot be allowed to serve as leverage during negotiations on migration and refugee policy.

— Paving the Way for Implementing UN Resolution 2250

The Federal Government should set an example to the world with regard to reinforcing the role of young people in conflict management as set out in UN Resolution 2250. This will require an interdepartmental strategy that provides for the development and implementation of measures and funding instruments for young people in the field of conflict management.

— Increasing Funding for Education in Conflict Zones

Education is key to offering children a way out of violence and poverty. The Federal Government should improve access to education by making available additional resources for multilateral education funds and in-

vesting eight percent of the German Federal Foreign Office's humanitarian assistance budget in education.

— Doing More to Advocate for Children's Rights in the UN Security Council

In its position as a temporary member of the UN Security Council, the Federal Government should be a more vocal advocate of concrete initiatives to protect children during wars and conflicts. This includes the systematic prosecution of governmental and non-governmental actors for severe children's rights abuses, such as rejecting humanitarian assistance for children and targeting essential infrastructure for destruction (e.g. hospitals, health clinics, schools, food supplies, and drinking water supplies).

— Reinforcing Reintegration Efforts for Child Soldiers and Protecting Children from Recruitment

Children must be better protected from being recruited as soldiers, and programmes to reintegrate former child soldiers require better and more reliable funding. For peaceful development to be successful, young people need prospects other than violence.

— Stopping Arms Exports

The export of armaments to conflict zones – including small arms and their associated munitions – should be categorically prohibited. The Bundestag, the German federal parliament, should pass a restrictive and enforceable law controlling arms exports.

GERMAN ODA — DATA, FACTS, TRENDS

This chapter provides an overview of Germany's public expenditure for Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2017 as defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD-DAC provides criteria for evaluating public funds for development assistance. The OECD published its latest available data, namely for the year 2017, on 20 December 2018.

REDUCTION IN ANNUAL GERMAN ODA FIGURES

At USD 147 billion in 2017, the ODA of all OECD-DAC donor countries has stagnated at 2016 levels. In absolute terms, the largest donors are the USA, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France, comprising approximately three quarters of the DAC members' total ODA contributions. However, a different picture emerges when ODA expenditure is examined in relation to the size of the respective donor country's national economy.


In 1972, the world's industrialised countries – under the auspices of the UN – committed to spending 0.7 percent of their gross national product (GNP) on development assistance for poorer countries. The USA, although globally the largest donor in absolute terms, falls well short of this target. At 0.18 percent,

its contribution is also below average. The Scandinavian countries form the global vanguard, either meeting or exceeding the target. Germany, with its contribution of 0.67 percent, is well placed in the rankings, just below the UK and close to the target rate of 0.7 percent.

After six years of growth, Germany's ODA rate peaked at 0.7 percent in 2016. Even in absolute terms, its 2017 ODA spending falls short of 2016 figures. The latest values therefore represent a reduction that can be expected to continue in the coming years.

Expenditure for refugees in Germany, which increased significantly starting in 2015, played a major role in the record-setting ODA values of recent years.

At EUR 5.37 billion, it represented a quarter of German ODA in 2017. Germany's ODA rate is set to fall in line with the projected reduction in expenditure in this field. According to the latest budget plans, no



other sectors are expected to grow sufficiently to fill this gap. Although spending on development cooperation has been significantly increased for 2019, the federal budget for 2018 to 2022 indicates that reductions will be made in the coming years.⁰¹

22.18

BILLION EURO WAS SPENT BY GERMANY ON DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN 2017

ODA OBJECTIVE FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES NOT YET ACHIEVED

In the Istanbul Programme of Action, the Federal Government undertook to spend between 0.15 and

0.2 percent of GNP on the least developed countries (LDC). This status is awarded to countries that are deemed to require special assistance in accordance with UN criteria due to significant economic, social, and ecological challenges. However, only EUR 3.62 billion of Germany's ODA went to LDCs in 2017. This amounts to little more than one sixth of Germany's ODA as a whole, corresponding to approximately 0.11 percent of GNP. Although this figure indicates a slight upward trend, Germany is still not fulfilling its commitment to the Istanbul Programme of Action.

Of the top ten recipients of Germany's ODA, Afghanistan is the only LDC. The other nine countries have a mid-level income or can be classed as emerging economies. The highest amount per capita goes to Syria. Although categorised as a lower middle-income country, Syria has been a major recipient of humanitarian assistance since war and the collapse


of governmental control led to disease, displacement, extreme poverty, and food and nutrition insecurity. The large-scale grants being sent to Turkey are also related to the crisis in Syria. Meanwhile, India, the largest recipient of German ODA, is home to an estimated 48 million people⁰² living on less than two dollars per day, which brings down the per capita spending for one of the world's most populated countries.

Even so, both India and China are receiving ODA based primarily on opportunities to mobilise market funds rather than on the number of people living in poverty.⁰³ In a similar vein, it is notable that Morocco and Mexico are major recipients despite their relatively low poverty rates. Since the national economies of both countries fall on the larger side of the scale, the proportion of ODA to the respective GDP is small. This raises the question of how much value this expenditure can add in the first place.

LDC FUNDING FAVOURS CONFLICT COUNTRIES

By a large margin, the LDC currently receiving the most support is Afghanistan. Torn apart by civil war, the country (where German troops have long been stationed) accounts for almost one fifth of ODA expenditure for LDCs, at USD 478.43 million. The 2017 Conflict Barometer published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) shows that Germany's ODA for LDCs displays a strong bias towards countries ravaged by war or conflict. In principle, this is a reasonable and natural point of focus.

However, LDCs not in the throes of violence also need support, often in order to recover from a recent conflict or to prevent one from developing. In Sierra Leone or Liberia, for example, the underlying assumption is that land conflicts were contrib-



uting causes for the civil wars in the 1990s and 2000s. Many of the systemic causes for these land conflicts (including disputed property borders, multiple sales, forged ownership documents, and unclear government purviews) remain unresolved, threatening to spark further social conflict and political instability. External support could contribute to the establishment of functioning institutions in areas such as land administration, thereby helping prevent the recurrence of violent altercations.

HIGHER EFFECTIVENESS IS REQUIRED FROM GERMAN ODA

When it comes to the effectiveness of German development cooperation, quantity is not the only concern. Quality matters too. At the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, Germany joined the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. One of the guiding principles of effective development cooperation asserted at the forum in Busan was that partner countries are responsible for set-


ting their own priorities. According to the latest data published by the Global Partnership for Effective De-

velopment Co-operation (GPEDC), Germany is not giving sufficient consideration to these priorities. Although four out of five German development cooperation programmes conform to the respective partner country's development strategies, they rarely observe the corresponding accountability framework. On average, only half of the success indicators for these interventions correspond to the indicators for national and local development strategies. Similarly, only half of the data is acquired through government-based sources.

Furthermore, only one third of ODA is implemented through the public financial and procurement structures established in the partner countries⁰⁴. Said structures are known to pose various challenges and risks. However, avoiding these risks altogether would mean losing the chance to help partner countries develop the ability to implement

ODA OF OECD-DAC DONOR COUNTRIES IN 2017

Percentage of gross national product (left axis); in USD million (blue); Source: OECD; Date: January 2019



PRIMARY RECIPIENT OF GERMAN ODA IN 2017


In USD million; Source: OECD (ODA), IMF (GDP), CIA World Factbook (population); Date: January 2019

	GERMAN ODA in Mio. US-\$	SHARE OF GDP* in percent	ODA PER CAPITA in US-\$
1 INDIA	1 181,8	0,05	0,91
2 SYRIA	879,8	1,98	45,22
3 CHINA	710,3	0,01	0,51
4 TURKEY	657,9	0,08	8,10
5 IRAQ	534,3	0,28	13,29
6 AFGHANISTAN	478,4	2,36	13,69
7 MOROCCO	459,3	0,42	13,39
8 INDONESIA	332,8	0,03	1,27
9 JORDAN	332,1	0,83	31,75
10 MEXICO	317,5	0,03	2,52

* GDP of recipient countries

PRIMARY RECIPIENT OF GERMAN ODA FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN 2017

In USD million; Source: OECD (ODA), Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (conflict status); Date: January 2019




PROGRESS IN TERMS OF TRANSPARENCY

Transparency was one of the principles reinforced at the forum in Busan. Germany also joined the Open Government Partnership initiative, which includes a commitment to transparency in development cooperation. Information about how much funding goes to which projects, regions, and target groups can help improve the effectiveness of development cooperation in multiple ways. For one thing, it can lead to better coordination between donors and implementing organisations, thereby preventing situations in which work is underfunded in some areas and needlessly duplicated in others. For another, it can help give both government and civil society actors in the Global South a useful overview of externally financed development projects in their own country. Benefits for local governments include improved budget planning for local spending and more effective use of public funds.

their own projects. Involving local government and civil society actors more closely in the implementation process could contribute significantly to the quality of governance and public administration.

In comparison to other donor countries, Germany scores highly in only one of the four categories listed in the QuODA Index, namely “Transparency and Learning”. Its score is boosted by its membership in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) as well as the general quality of the ODA data submitted to OECD-DAC. In all other respects, Germany is behind the rest of the pack. In terms of “Maximising Efficiency”, it ranks 26th out of 27 countries; a major reason for this is that Germany’s ODA spending for LDCs is comparatively small. In the “Reducing Burden” category, Germany is also 26th, partially due to the sheer number of government bodies involved in German development cooperation. Germany is 21st in “Fostering Institutions”, still in the lowest quartile but higher than the other two categories by virtue of its adherence to the Busan principles of effective development cooperation.



QuODA-Index

The Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA) Index takes a closer look at the standard of development assistance being provided. Devised by the Centre for Global Development, this index evaluates 27 donor countries and 13 multilateral institutions in terms of donor fulfilment of obligations that have been proven to contribute to the effectiveness of ODA. The 2018 edition of the QuODA Index explores four dimensions using 24 indicators:

- ◆ “Maximising Efficiency” assesses strategic decisions to distribute ODA throughout countries and sectors as well as availability for recipient countries.
- ◆ “Fostering Institutions” evaluates the donor’s contribution to long-term institutional development in relation to the recipient’s priorities.
- ◆ In the “Reducing Burden” category, a donor receives a good score if they prevent ODA redundancies and fragmentation by coordinating with other donors.
- ◆ “Transparency and Learning” assesses the quality of the ODA data as well as the scope of the donors’ evaluations.

The QuODA Index is based on the data and indices of relevant institutions, such as information provided by the OECD, monitoring data from the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), and the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. The collected values can be easily compared for the individual dimensions, giving context to an individual country’s figures. The number zero (0) represents the mean, with values deviating in both positive and negative directions. This means that the values reflect the relative position of one country to the others rather than absolute developments.

Access to this information is also a prerequisite for accountability since the donor countries’ commitments are otherwise unable to be reviewed. Since 2017, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has published data on its own spending – including expenditure through GIZ and KfW – on a monthly basis and in accordance with the IATI format. Other ministries that provide ODA should follow this example, particularly the Federal Foreign Office, which is the

second-largest source of ODA in Germany.

DEVELOPMENT REQUIRES POLITICAL COHERENCE

Development cooperation objectives cannot be met through ODA alone. Many other fields of policy in the donor countries have an influence on development in the partner countries. Since 2003, the Center

for Global Development (CGD) has published the Commitment to Development Index (CDI), which takes a broader approach to evaluating the development orientation of industrialised countries. Seven policy fields are assessed: development cooperation, finance, technology, environment, trade, security, and migration. In the current CDI (for 2018), Germany ranks remarkably high, tying with Finland for third place. Better yet, it could potentially make improvements in several of these policy fields, including security, finance, and the environment in addition to the effectiveness of its development cooperation.⁰⁵

GROWTH IN FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY, AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE; FOCUS NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED

The Federal Government has promised to commit more strongly to reducing hunger and malnutrition on multiple occasions in the past five years. At the Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2013, for example, it pledged an additional EUR 200 million for interventions in the field of nutrition by 2020.⁰⁶ In 2015, in the G7 Summit Declaration in Elmau, the government undertook to work with the other G7 countries to save 500 million people from hunger and malnutrition by 2030.⁰⁷ It reiterated this promise in the 2018 coalition agreement. However, these memoranda of understanding are not backed by any implementation plans or sufficient accountability mechanisms that are able to assess whether the goals are actually being achieved.

The Federal Government has also declared its commitment to the targets defined in the Rome Declaration on Nutrition, which was issued at the International Conference

on Nutrition in 2014, as well as the objectives set out in Agenda 2030, in particular the second objective, which aims to eliminate all forms of malnutrition by 2030.

It is a challenge to calculate the expenditure involved in achieving sustainable food and nutrition security. This term encompasses two types of measure: nutrition-specific measures, which deal with direct causes of malnutrition, and nutrition-sensitive measures, which have an indirect effect on nutrition.

Direct causes include both inadequate nutritional intake in terms of quantity and/or quality as well as illnesses that prevent the body from properly absorbing nutrients, e.g. diarrhoea. Projects that address these problems fall under the OECD-DAC category of “Basic Nutrition”. However, this category does not provide the full picture since several relevant measures are part of larger, integrated programmes and are therefore placed in other categories.

Germany’s expenditure in this sector is in a state of flux. Until 2012, it stagnated at an insignificant level of between USD 3 and 4 million. In 2013, it suddenly shot up by a factor of ten to around USD 32 million, peaking at USD 52 million in 2015. Afterwards, it fell again to a moderate USD 18 to 19 million. The 2015 spike can largely be attributed to spending in conjunction with the conflict in Yemen. All the same, the Federal Government’s investment in basic nutrition measures increased sixfold between 2008 and 2017. In the past, no shared system existed for assess-

IATI — New Technological Standard for Greater Transparency in Development Cooperation

In the past, OECD-DAC statistics have served as the main source of data regarding public expenditure on development cooperation. OECD-DAC is also the forum in which donor countries set uniform reporting standards. However, these donor countries report to OECD-DAC only once a year. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was founded in 2008 to facilitate a decentralised reporting system.

IATI developed an open data format that can be used by any donor, whether public or private. Data sets are entered into the IATI register and can be updated by the donor at any time. This offers all donors the opportunity to publish data at their discretion. Additional information about financed projects can also be entered. At the same time, this format is compatible with OECD-DAC reporting standards, meaning that nothing needs to be repeated. The publication of data in the IATI format gives civil society actors and scientists a simple way to access, analyse, and compare current data

ing nutrition-sensitive measures. The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) network addressed this issue by developing a marker similar to the one used for projects relevant to the climate. This marker was accepted by the OECD in 2018 and is set to be implemented by donors by no later than 2020. It accounts for projects that target nutrition status improvements in sectors such as agriculture, the drinking water supply, social security, and women’s empowerment.

The agricultural sector warrants a closer look because investments in nutrition-sensitive measures are not reflected in past OECD-DAC data, and sufficient quantity and quality in terms of food production represent a basic requirement when it comes to food security. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) contends that growth in the agricultural sector has three times the effect on reducing hunger and poverty in comparison to other sectors.⁰⁸

In contrast to the global trend, which shows this expenditure to be stagnating, Germany more than tripled its ODA in the agricultural sector from USD 178 to 620 million between 2008 and 2017. These increases were already significant by 2014; in the three years after that, the amount more than doubled. This has secured Germany a prominent position among the DAC countries.

This is a wide-ranging category, encompassing measures such as

irrigation, marketing, land rights, agricultural research, soil fertility improvement, financial services for farmers, and capacity building for groups such as cooperatives. This upward trend can be largely attributed to the international commitments that Germany accepted and fulfilled under the auspices of the G8/G7 and the G20. This expenditure includes major contributions to multilateral institutions, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). German financing has helped IFAD to structure its aid policies and measures along nutrition-sensitive lines.⁰⁹

BMZ’s One World – No Hunger special initiative (SEWOH) has been contributing to increases in expenditure in the food and agricultural sector since 2014. Its flagship programmes in the agricultural sector

are represented by Green Innovation Centres founded in 14 countries as part of the initiative. Their goal is to increase crop yields, raise income, and create food processing jobs. They prioritise market-based value chains, which predominantly help farming operations that already fulfil the conditions for a market-oriented business approach.

To help reduce malnutrition on a meaningful level, one explicit goal for these measures should be to bring about improvements to the nutrition situation of the most vulnerable groups. The cultivation and consumption of nutritious and locally available food should be promoted more strongly, as should rapid, local marketing options for fresh, affordable food.¹⁰ The farmers’ expertise and potential should be utilised even more thoroughly in order to drive in-


novation and adaptation to local conditions¹¹


Despite being in need of some amendments, SEWOH remains a crucial instrument for fulfilling the Federal Government’s commitment to reducing hunger and malnutrition; this is particularly the case with regard to the second sustainable development goal, namely “Zero Hunger” (SDG 2). For this reason, the initiative should be extended to 2030.

The Rural Development category encompasses projects located in rural areas that address issues beyond food production while potentially affecting rural food and nutrition security (whether directly or indirectly). Although rural development expenditure has fluctuated in the past ten years, a steady increase in funding for rural development has materialised starting in 2015, with spending rising

“We aim to lift 500 million people in developing countries out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030.”

G7 SUMMIT DECLARATION IN ELMAU, 2015





from USD 128 to 150 million in 2016 and then again to USD 169 million in 2017. This rise bucked the downward trend among DAC countries.

In 2017, these funds financed rural infrastructure and programmes for creating employment and alternative sources of income. Efforts to create future prospects in rural areas are categorically beneficial. However, it is important to ensure that such measures reach vulnerable groups, in particular young people and women.¹² Projects focussing on food security were also prominently represented in this expenditure category in 2017. Integrated approaches that combine measures from various sectors are especially promising, incorporating health, social security, water supply, hygiene, and education while pursuing cooperation with governments and decentralised management structures.


INCREASE IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMPONENT OF GERMAN ODA

The past five years have seen a steady rise in the funds provided by Germany for emergency aid. In 2017, this figure amounted to USD 1.93 billion or approximately nine percent of the total German ODA. Between 2012 and 2017, while global humanitarian assistance was doubling,¹³ Germany's contribution increased nearly eight-fold. Expenditure for reconstruction has recently also risen, albeit less significantly.

These figures demonstrate that Germany recognises its global responsibilities and does indeed help people in need. However, it is crucial to qualify this statement with

the observation that funds for disaster prevention and risk reduction are lagging behind, comparatively speaking. In light of current and developing conflicts due to climate change-related resource shortages, prevention programmes are becoming ever more important. Developing countries have the greatest need of increased funding for conflict prevention and early-warning systems so that potential emergencies and crises may be warded off more successfully. Prevention before the fact is much more cost effective than dealing with damage repair afterwards.¹⁴

The OECD's latest State of Fragility report¹⁵ reveals a similar trend. ODA is focussed on just a few countries in crisis, with only two percent of ODA going towards conflict prevention and peace promotion.



Part II: Commentary on the Federal Government's Africa Policy

AFRICA NEEDS BOLD SOLUTIONS

Africa has been a priority for the Federal Government since 2015. Issues relating to migration and refugees – including migration from Africa via the Mediterranean – have become increasingly visible in politics and the media. The Federal Government issued guidelines for Africa policy during the preceding legislative period, and BMZ has increased its focus on the African continent through a series of special initiatives. The current Federal Government has expanded its level of political engagement in Africa.

Working with other wealthy countries, the Federal Government can help mitigate and overcome the key political, socio-economic, and environmental challenges faced by Africa – and which also affect Europe. However, priority should be given to the people of Africa, who are seeking opportunities to lead a life of dignity and freedom.

NO SUCH THING AS “AFRICA”

One of the greatest challenges stems from the immense complexity and diversity of the continent; “Africa”, as such, does not exist. The continent consists of 54 countries, each of which faces different obstacles requiring different solutions. The spectrum ranges from countries enjoying extended economic growth and a higher level of development (Botswana, Ghana) to countries

with impoverished populations despite a wealth of natural resources (Nigeria, Mozambique) to extremely fragile countries¹⁶ wracked by war and violence (DR Congo, South Sudan). Africa simply cannot be reduced to the stereotype of being a place of either pure disaster or boundless opportunity.

HUNGER REMAINS A PROBLEM DESPITE PROGRESS

The nutrition situation also calls for a nuanced approach. Since the turn of the millennium, hunger and undernutrition in Africa South of the Sahara have been reduced by a total of one third, as evidenced by the Global Hunger Index¹⁷. However, the rates of undernutrition, growth stunting, and child mortality remain very high in many countries, such as the Central African Republic and Chad. A total of 236 million people in Africa South of the Sahara do not have enough to eat¹⁸. In Somalia, South Sudan, and Nigeria, more than ten million people were threatened by famine in 2017–2018 due to a potent combination of armed conflict and drought¹⁹. By contrast, Ghana, for example, was able to significantly improve its nutrition situation as a whole.

The development of poverty is comparably complex. Although poverty has been reduced in many African countries, broad swathes of the population (especially in rural

areas) are not benefiting from the economic upswing. The primary problem is jobless growth, i.e. too few jobs being created²⁰. This makes the growing number of young people without any future prospects one of the continent’s greatest challenges. Estimates project that half of Africa’s population will be under 18 years of age by 2035.²¹

Welthungerhilfe believes the Federal Government’s Africa policy should address this complex problem with an approach adapted to the respective context. This approach should pursue the Sustainable Development Goals set out in Agenda 2030 and observe human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights as well as the human right to food. The Africa policy should be based on partnerships and build on the commitments and programmes adopted by the African Union in the form of Agenda 2063, and should bolster the population’s stake in political, social, and economic processes. Finally, Germany’s Africa policy should be coherent, consistent, and in agreement with other donor countries, especially from those within the EU.

A RANGE OF INITIATIVES AND NEW POINTS OF FOCUS

Many new strategy papers and initiatives have taken shape within the

Federal Government at both the intra- and interdepartmental levels. Due to the current direction taken by domestic political discourse, these papers are increasingly addressing migration and refugees issues, with the result that measures to reduce migration and the promotion of private investment are gaining traction.

Specifically, *the Marshall Plan with Africa* (January 2017) is a BMZ initiative intended to establish a “new partnership with Africa” where a comprehensive approach based on three pillars is pursued: “Economy, Commerce, and Employment”, “Peace and Security”, and “Democracy and the Rule of Law”.

Under the direction of the Federal Ministry of Finance, *the Compact with Africa* was initiated during Germany’s G20 presidency with the goal of creating jobs and improving conditions for private investment, especially for infrastructure projects.

The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology’s *Pro! Africa initiative* combines measures for economic development with partnerships in areas such as energy and digitalisation.

In an effort to connect German companies with African governments, the Federal Government organised a major investment summit and announced a development investment fund that includes the AfricaConnect fund for German and European investment in Africa, Africa Grow for small and medium-sized African enterprises, and the Africa commercial network.

The Federal Government’s *interdepartmental benchmark paper “African Economic Development: Challenges and Options”* (June 2017) describes how the various initiatives can be consolidated and presented as Germany’s contribution to the Compact with Africa. For this purpose, an interdepartmental group for Africa was formed, comprising permanent secretaries from the German Chancellery, the Federal Foreign Office (FFO), the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), the Federal Ministry

of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.

In the new BMZ strategy paper titled “Development Policy 2030” (November 2018), it announced that development assistance will be restructured in favour of an approach focussing on “funding and promoting” and that the number of partner countries will be reduced accordingly. A variety of development measures have now been combined under the label “A Future at Home” (German: *Perspektive Heimat*) in order to encourage people to remain at home or return to their place of origin.

The Federal Government is entering new partnerships with *Compact countries* (headed by BMF) and *Reform countries* (headed by BMZ) to implement its new Africa policy.²² Governments seeking to join the Compact must commit to a policy matrix²³ with macro-economic indicators. So far, twelve countries have joined the initiative: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Togo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Reform countries must meet additional criteria²⁴ in the areas of corruption, good governance, and business-friendly framework condi-

tions. In addition to the initial three Reform countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Tunisia), partnerships negotiations with three more countries (Ethiopia, Morocco, and Senegal) began in autumn 2018.

The Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety are also pursuing their own political strategies for Africa. The *guidelines for the Africa policy*, revised under the direction of the Federal Foreign Office, are intended to constitute the Federal Government’s primary strategic document. The revised and expanded guidelines were not yet available as of the time of going to press.

From Welthungerhilfe’s perspective, these new strategy papers and initiatives do not follow Agenda 2030 or human rights closely enough. How they fall short is detailed below.

On promoting private investment: It is encouraging that German businesses want to become more involved in Africa; private investment is indispensable for socio-economic development. However, more must be done if such investments are to clearly promote development. The Federal Government should ensure that investments made abroad by its own departments or by German development banks do good work, help

“One of the greatest challenges for any Africa policy is posed by the continent’s immense complexity and diversity.”

reduce poverty, and comply with social, environmental, and human rights standards.

This is why the transformation towards positive social change²⁵ also includes bolstering the efforts of small and medium-sized enterprises in the investment countries, e.g. through the transfer of technology. It would therefore constitute an advantage for the development investment fund to support small and medium-sized enterprises, too.

On migration reduction: The purpose of development policies is to fight poverty. As a result, border enforcement should not be implemented using development assistance funds and, in particular, it should not be made a prerequisite for maintaining the latter.

The increasing entanglement of domestic, refugee, and development policies is reflected in the Federal Ministry of the Interior's *Migration Master Plan*. The paradigm shift in development policy, which favours migration management and combatting the root causes of displacement, is most clearly visible in the new European development fund, the *EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)*, whose largest donor by far is Germany²⁶. The EUTF also serves to finance the migration partnerships introduced in 2016; to date, these partnerships have been established with Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. According to this arrangement, the provision of development assistance hinges on improved migration management and the repatriation of refugees and migrants.

This approach contradicts the 2017²⁷ EU consensus on development policy, which is based on the Treaty of Lisbon and confirms that the overriding objective of development policy is to fight poverty. Even if measures funded by the EUTF are all intended to improve living conditions and create food security, the instrument's objectives remain in significant conflict. A variety of

studies have reached the conclusion that the EUTF's partner countries and projects are selected not on the basis of need in terms of fighting poverty, but according to their migration profile.²⁸

On coherence: For Germany's Africa policy to correspond to the goals of Agenda 2030, coherence must be achieved between development

aid objectives and commercial and agricultural policy. The future relationship between the European Union and Africa (as well as other countries in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific communities) will be decided primarily by the post-Cotonou Agreement. An impact analysis commissioned by the EU regarding the Cotonou Agreement to date drew mixed conclusions: although polit-

ical dialogue has led to better communication and integration into the global market has improved, the dependency on a limited number of agricultural products and raw materials persists. Development cooperation has indeed succeeded in significantly reducing poverty, but incomes are still distributed unevenly.²⁹

On coordination: An interdepartmental group for Africa at the permanent secretary level is tasked with coordinating the various activities. However, the African partner countries are currently being visited by delegations from a range of federal ministries, indicating a lack of coordination. An absence of unity regarding which direction to take is evident at the EU level, too, especially between Germany and France. A unified, partnership-based European Africa policy would send a strong signal, including to the new actors on the African continent.

On partnerships with Africa, building on Agenda 2063, and the participation of civil society: Although the Federal Government acknowledges the African Union's Agenda 2063 in its strategy papers, especially BMZ's Marshall Plan, it has so far shown little indication of where and how its practical implementation connects to the African Union's First Ten Year Implementation Plan, which is based on Agenda 2063. Instead, the Compact is based primarily on macro-economic and investment opportunity indicators, and is therefore paying too little attention to the environmental, socio-economic, and human rights effects of the resulting activities in the respective country.

The lack of perspective could be offset by civil society organisations from the partner countries or non-governmental organisations active in development aid. The Compact calls for broad stakeholder participation but limits the same participation exclusively to the respective government, three international organisations – the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African Development Bank (AfDB) – and investors.³⁰ This is hardly the way to achieve inclusive growth with equitable distribution and a broad societal base.

THE POINTS MADE ABOVE INSPIRE SIX KEY DEMANDS TO BE MADE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO ITS AFRICA POLICY:

◆ **Explicitly Focussing on Fighting Hunger and Poverty:**

Although representatives of the Federal Government tend to refer to the fight against hunger and poverty as something natural and obvious, it continues to require explicit action in order to avoid falling behind the other priorities. The basis for the fight against hunger should be the right to food as defined in the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the Voluntary Guidelines in support of the same goals (FAO 2004)³¹, which offer guidance for fighting hunger from the victims' point of view while taking their rights and needs into consideration.

The Federal Government had significantly advanced the development of the Voluntary Guidelines to support the right to food and launched a variety of related programmes; as a result, this pioneering effort deserves recognition. The same goes for the UN country guidelines³² (FAO/CFS 2012), which established the affected population's right of ownership in terms of agricultural investment in order to prevent land grabbing.³³ These human rights-based instruments should continue to form the strategic framework for a coherent anti-hunger policy. Furthermore, the implementation of these instruments should be expanded by BMZ and the Federal Ministry of Food

and Agriculture (BMEL), for example to include programmes whose aim is to revise national policies and laws using these human rights-based instruments.

The One World – No Hunger special initiative (SEWOH) should be developed as a strategic priority for BMZ and extended beyond the current legislative period. SEWOH calls for capacity building and a more intensive focus on the most vulnerable demographics. Investment and innovation in rural areas continue to be urgently needed in order to develop a productive, innovative, and ecologically sustainable agricultural sector³⁴ (see Part I).

◆ **Providing More Support to the Least Developed Countries:**

The focus on champions of reform entails the risk that more official development assistance (ODA) will go to relatively developed countries, leaving the least developed countries (LDC) much further behind and with an ever-diminishing level of support. Of the world's 47 LDCs, 33 are in Africa. The OECD's latest States of Fragility report confirms this picture.³⁵ It reveals that the majority of fragile states are in Africa, while global ODA is focussed on a few politically visible countries such as Syria and Afghanistan, leaving African countries such as Chad, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Congo far behind.

Countries with a good level of development and stable political framework conditions are able to successfully fight hunger and poverty independently, as is demonstrated in the case of Ghana. Since 2006, Ghana has managed to cut rates of extreme poverty in half.³⁶ Major contributing factors to the country's success included agricultural investment and social security programmes³⁷. In a multi-sectoral effort led by the National Development Planning Commission, the government implemented anti-malnutrition measures in the sectors of health, ed-

What the African Union's Agenda 2063 Says

One of the key normative operational frameworks for African countries is Agenda 2063, which has been adopted by the African Union (AU). This document also serves as a central reference point for the political activities of civil society organisations in Africa. Agenda 2030 was adopted in 2013 to mark the 10th anniversary of the AU and was updated in 2015. Based on Agenda 2030, it presents the African vision for the socio-economic transformation of the continent with concrete goals for the next 50 years. Close consultation was sought with African civil society actors when Agenda 2063 was drafted.⁵⁷

The seven objectives of Agenda 2063 include: growth and sustainable development; good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law; security and peace; and the political unity of the continent based on a common pan-African vision and identity. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is central to the implementation of Agenda 2063. At the 31st AU Summit in Nouakchott in 2018, the African representatives decided to create a new AU Development Agency (AU DA) as a successor to NEPAD. Going forward, AUDA will – as an autonomous agency and technical organ – be responsible for implementing all AU programmes, including the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).⁵⁸ As the bridge between continental development strategies and their regional and national implementation⁵⁹, AUDA will serve as the point of contact for any external bilateral or multilateral partners in the future.

ucation, and agriculture. Strategic lessons learned in pilot programmes were then applied to other parts of the country in conjunction with development partners.³⁸

Circumstances are much different in countries that are mired in armed conflict or led by governments unwilling or unable to guarantee basic social services for their citizens in terms of nutrition, education, and healthcare. Development cooperation helps save lives and create prospects. With reform-minded partners in positions of power, it can also help to bring about structural change. This means that Germany has to meet its international obligation to spend between 0.15 and 0.2 percent of GNP on LDCs, and should establish a step-by-step plan in order to achieve this goal. Food and nutrition security and the fight against poverty should be a focus for bilateral cooperation in the LDCs.

◆ **Structuring Private Investment to Promote Development Aid and Human Rights:** More effort is required to structure private investment in order to promote development aid. Following multiple evaluations, the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval)³⁹ reached the conclusion that although involving companies can, in theory, lead to development goals being reached more effectively and quickly, promises have thus far rarely been kept. Entrepreneurial and development goals are generally not congruent, and the target groups for development aid are usually not the preferred clientele or business partners of such companies. On the contrary, the companies receiving advice from GIZ, KfW, and DEG are primarily interested in risk minimisation related to market development or to the procurement of raw materials.

Due to the variety of goals and interests, the social and ecological benefit expected to be gained

from the funded investment should be substantiated and formalised in the agreements. To avoid dead weight, government support should primarily cover additional costs, for example training expenses for small-scale farmers or for workers who would not otherwise have had the chance of finding a job due to a lack of qualifications. In addition, the funding provided cannot be permitted to damage the partner countries' economies.

When investing in authoritarian countries that lack effective control by parliament, media, or an independent justice system, human rights should be considered very carefully, especially for major investments in infrastructure, mining, or large-scale agriculture. Although the development banks KfW and DEG are well equipped to assess social, environmental, and human rights standards, they should commission an additional independent impact analysis for human rights in critical cases. The affected population must be clearly informed and involved in the planning process.⁴⁰ Information about investing public funds must be made available in Germany as well without recourse to banking confidentiality.

The primary guidelines for the human rights obligations to be met by the governments of the investors' countries of origin are defined by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights⁴¹, which should be incorporated into every business strategy for Africa and elsewhere. Germany is implementing the Guiding Principles through its National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights; in this context, the Federal Government is still counting on voluntary compliance and intends to anonymously audit individual companies at random. Quite apart from this, the Federal Government should work towards legally binding standards, as recommended in a BMZ report for a draft law. Other countries such as France are already one step

ahead of Germany, having instituted legislation to regulate a duty of care for human rights.⁴²

Observing the human right to food should be a binding component of sustainability strategies in both the public and private sectors. To meet this requirement, public and private procurement practices should be systematically monitored for compliance with standards at each link in the supply chain. In conjunction with the Centre of Development Research (ZEF) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Welthungerhilfe is developing the Food Security Standard (FSS), which addresses the right to food at the local level in export-based agriculture, i.e. the first link of the agricultural value chain.⁴³

◆ **Not Subordinating Development Policy to Migration Reduction:** Flight and migration from Africa through the Mediterranean have led the EU to attempt to expand its border security activities to incorporate countries in northern African as well. German bilateral cooperation is also resulting in more projects for border management,⁴⁴ which are focussed on the countries of origin, those along the migration route, and the ones bordering the Mediterranean.

Collaboration with authoritarian and corrupt regimes constitutes a problem. Since 2016, for example, Egypt has received EUR 2.8 million and Nigeria EUR 3.3 million for police programmes and equipment. Measures for border management that serve to repel migration should not be equated with development measures or classified as ODA.

By way of example, the following was counted as ODA in 2017⁴⁵: support for Nigeria, the introduction of biometric personal identification, data programmes for monitoring Nigeria's land and sea borders, and phase three of the Africa Police Programme. Target groups include the ministries

for domestic security and national police organisations; activities include forensics training for fighting transnational organised crime and for border security as well as the construction of police and border guard outposts, police academies, and forensics laboratories. This took place in DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. Measures to reinforce human rights were not listed despite the fact that they should

have been an integral component in these countries in particular given their substandard human rights records.⁴⁶

Even if the ODA classification is made in accordance with OECD-DAC regulations, the benefit this presents in terms of development aid is highly questionable. More intensive border protection will not dissuade people from leaving their country due to hunger, poverty, and/or war. By contrast, this requires

long-term structural development measures in order to create sustainable prospects for a dignified life. Policy cooperation programmes should be structured to prioritise human rights-based reforms within the security sector with an emphasis on reinforcing good governance and the rule of law.

◆ **Building on the African Union's Programmes and Commitments:** The development framework for Africa is defined by Agenda 2063, as adopted by the African Union (AU). Programmes and commitments based on this document offer numerous concrete opportunities for Germany and the EU to enter into development partnerships with Africa. These opportunities should be better reflected in the Federal Government's programmes and strategies.

In the AU's 2003 Maputo Declaration,⁴⁷ which is part of its development strategy titled "New Partnership for Africa's Development" (NEPAD) and its Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), African governments declared their commitment to fighting hunger by investing ten percent of their budgets in agriculture by 2025. In the "Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods",⁴⁸ they also set a new target in the fight against hunger: Stunting, a symptom of chronic undernourishment in children under five years of age, is to be reduced to ten percent, and underweight rates to five percent.

The Federal Government places great importance on fighting corruption. In this context it could partner with the AU Advisory Board on Corruption, which has developed national model legislation to facilitate the adoption of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption at the national level.⁴⁹ Using this legislation as a basis, several Af-

Welthungerhilfe Consulted on BMZ Strategy for "Development Policy 2030"

Based on a translation of the original text, Welthungerhilfe consulted on behalf of representatives of African civil society and other dialogue partners in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia.⁶⁰ The participants criticised the paper's assumption that resources are scarce, stating that the real problem is resource distribution, which is also largely responsible for emigration.

The participants further criticised the increasingly restrictive conditions attached to development assistance, proposing to instead build on AU initiatives and provide support for reform projects. The civil society organisations often refer to AU initiatives and commitments and would like to see their profile raised among the international public and African citizens.

On the topic of private investment, the participants underlined that the goal must be a "win-win" situation. They consider the observation of human rights as well as environmental and social standards to be a key issue. In Burkina Faso, they pointed to the negative consequences of unregulated gold mining in rural areas. In Ethiopia, the hazardous working conditions in the country's new textile industrial parks were mentioned. Private investment should offer dignified employment opportunities to young people in particular.

rican countries have already established anti-corruption authorities, judicial instruments, and/or educational campaigns. In discussion with Welthungerhilfe, the President of the Advisory Council, Bégoto Mariam, lamented that there is too little awareness of such initiatives in donor countries and that they attract insufficient political and financial support.

The Federal Government should offer more technical and financial measures to build on and promote the implementation of the African Union's initiatives and commitments as well as its Agenda 2063. At the same time, it should call on its African partners to promote participation by civil society.

◆ **Creating Political and Financial Freedom for Civil Society Organisations:** The curtailment of civil society's freedoms ("shrinking space") also poses a major political challenge on the African continent.⁵⁰ In virtually every African country, the sphere of action of civil society groups is shrinking to a lesser or greater degree.⁵¹ Sierra Leone's new Development Cooperation Framework, for example, circumscribes national and international non-governmental organisations' freedom to pursue political action and advocacy for disadvantaged demographics.⁵²

Civil society organisations in developing countries are often also hampered by meagre revenue and weak organisational structures. This leads to competition for donations, a lack of specialisation, and few opportunities in terms of the long-term supervision of political processes. Welthungerhilfe has first-hand experience with how effective a well-organised civil society can be, with Liberia serving as a prime example: With the support of international partners (namely financing from EU and BMZ), the Liberian Civil Society Working Group on Land Reform was able to ensure that its key de-

mands were incorporated into the legislative process for the new land laws, making it one of the most progressive pieces of legislation on the continent.⁵³

Such success can be achieved only if national civil society organisations have the requisite resources and freedom of action. The Federal Government should ensure that the issue of shrinking space is consistently represented in political discourse, make better use of the tools available for defenders of human rights, and guarantee the protection of individual actors, for example via humanitarian visas. It should therefore develop a coherent strategy for protecting the freedoms of civil society based on regular reporting by German diplomatic missions.

Furthermore, development work conducted by civil society organisations should receive more financial support. Many German non-governmental organisations have expanded their capacities and can now assume a greater role in implementing Agenda 2030 in addition to bi- and multilateral development cooperation. They can do a great deal to help build the capacities of civil society organisations in partner countries and develop anti-poverty programmes that address the needs of the poorest members of society. This is especially important in fragile and corrupt countries where opportunities for bilateral cooperation are limited or absent entirely.

FOR COOPERATION IN AFRICA ON AN EQUAL FOOTING

As former President of Germany Horst Köhler asserted in a speech, "expanding political and economic differentiation on the African continent is pushing Germany's Africa policy towards greater strategic differentiation. This can only work if

it is based on better knowledge and increased inclusion of African issues and initiatives".⁵⁴ The era in which ideas and programmes developed in the Global North are simply transcribed to Africa should be over by now.⁵⁵ It is similarly not enough for heads of state and ministers to merely talk about cooperation and sign various declarations. Civil society, young people, and the economy in Africa and Europe should be much more involved in the dialogue about the future of relations between the two continents.

The countries of the Global North have lost a great deal of credibility in Africa, not only because of their colonial history but due to their policies in more recent years. Other actors have long since entered both the political and economic arenas, with the diplomatic vacuum in the AU and elsewhere being filled by other countries, in particular China⁵⁶, Turkey, and Russia.


In this regard, current President of Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier set the right tone in his address in Addis Ababa during his latest trip to the African continent, saying: "We Europeans need new, trusting partnerships with Ethiopia and as many other African countries as possible. We will only be able to find solutions to global challenges if we work together with you." However, this spirit is hardly reflected in Germany's current political discourse, which is often dominated by interests pertaining to domestic, security, and economic policies. As a nation, we do not seem to understand that Germany – which, unlike the UK or France, was never a major actor in Africa – is continuing to lose importance on the continent and is therefore in no position to dictate conditions to its African partner countries. Solutions to the complex challenges can only be found in partnership with African countries, in dialogue with civil society, and in communication with other governments that are active on the continent.



*Ethiopia, Morocco, and Senegal have been negotiating for a reform partnership since 2018

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PARTNERSHIPS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Source: Generated by Welthungerhilfe using the following sources: BMZ (Marshall Plan with Africa, Compact with Africa, Strategy Paper 2030), EC (Migration Partnership Framework)⁶¹



Part III: Commentary on the Federal Government's Role in Supporting Children and Young People in (Post-)Conflict Situations

MORE COHERENCE, MORE VEHEMENCE, MORE SUSTAINABILITY

Armed conflict threatens the lives of nearly one in five children⁶² around the world. In this context, 'life-threatening' means that combat is taking place within 50 kilometres of the child's residence. Since 1990, the number of children affected by war and violence has risen from around 200 million to 420 million.⁶³ In 2016, one in four young people (ages 15 to 29) was affected by violent conflict; this equates to 408 million people.⁶⁴ Children make up around 40 to 50 percent of the total population of nine of the ten most dangerous countries on earth for children (*cf. chart on p. 27*).⁶⁵

In addition to being victims of armed conflict, children and youths are often forced to participate in violence, thereby becoming perpetrators as well. Armed conflicts constitute a heavy burden for people to bear in the future, too: Children who grow up in the midst of violence do not develop a positive perspective either for themselves or for the society in which they live and become of age. This makes it very important for peace and development policy, humanitarian assistance, and security policy to protect children and young people from violence and to offer them the opportunity to take on a peacemaking role. Several aspects from policy fields with particular relevance for children have been selected for discussion below. This is not intended to serve as a comprehensive report on the topic but rather to highlight current gaps and problems.

There are a variety of government and civil society initiatives and aid programmes that address the living situation of children and their families in conflict countries, with existing measures showing ways to support children and young people in conflict situations on their path to leading a life without violence. German development cooperation often provides a successful and exemplary contribution in this regard; however, it does not always pursue a clear strategy, lacking clarity, coherence, and transparency in conflict management with and for children as part of an overarching operational peace policy framework. Compatible measures are often implemented individually and in isolation, and some are counteracted by the goals set in other areas of policy.

This is despite the fact that finances, at least, are not a problem, with German ODA prioritising support for countries caught up in war

or post-conflict situations and therefore categorised as politically fragile (*cf. chart on p. 10*).

FIGURES AND DATA

Every war is a war against children.⁶⁶ The United Nations defines the most severe violations of children's rights during armed conflict to be killing and maiming, recruiting and employing child soldiers, sexual violence, kidnapping, attacking schools and hospitals, and denying access to humanitarian assistance. Following multiple resolutions by the UN Security Council, these abuses are now being documented via a global reporting and monitoring system supported by the Federal Government. The UN Secretary General's annual report on the situation of children in armed conflict is based on this data.

In 2017 alone, more than 21,000 such severe abuses of children's rights were recorded by the UN. This represents an increase of around 35 percent compared to the approximately 15,500 cases recorded in 2016.⁶⁷

Due to a lack of access to conflict zones, limited legal reconditioning, and the taboo nature of certain types of violence (in particular that of a sexual nature), the number of unreported cases is likely much higher. This becomes evident when considering the example of the forced recruitment of child soldiers:

21 000

**SEVERE ABUSES
OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
WERE COMMITTED
DURING CONFLICTS
IN 2017**

While the United Nations was able to verify more than 56,000 cases of child recruitment between 2005 and 2017, non-governmental organisations are operating on the assumption of figures of up to 250,000 children under 18 years of age based on their many years of experience in project and advocacy work. The exponential increase in the denial of access to humanitarian assistance has had drastic consequences for the survival of children. A range of

non-governmental organisations warn of the consequences of the rising number of famished and undernourished children in conflict regions.⁶⁸ Children and young people in South Sudan and Yemen are especially hard-hit, as are those in Syria, Mali, and Myanmar. Undernutrition, a lack of drinking water, the resulting diseases, and poor medical care are now killing more children than bombs, grenades, and bullets.⁶⁹ For children, the blockade

of humanitarian assistance is just as deadly as a bullet.

Wars and conflicts have a broad, intense impact on children's chances to develop and survive. They suffer the physical effects of war wounds, limited medical care, and poor nutrition, and this is exacerbated by the trauma caused by the violence, which can lead to a wide variety of mental illnesses.⁷⁰ Negative coping mechanisms are no less relevant; for example, war and conflict have resulted in a renewed increase of forced marriages for young girls in such regions. This phenomenon can be observed in South Sudan and Yemen as well as among Syrian refugees and the Rohingya in Bangladesh.⁷¹ The consequences of war and violence follow children into adulthood and often for the rest of their lives. They affect the parenting of their own children later on, thereby influencing the lives of subsequent generations as well.

The cited figures and data reveal an urgent need for action with regard to implementing the numerous UN resolutions on the protection of children and young people in conflict zones. The Federal Government must wield its influence to ensure that child protection regulations are observed during armed conflict. It should use its time as a member of the UN Security Council specifically for this purpose.

STRATEGIES AND INITIATIVES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

In the past two decades, the Federal Government has signed significant UN resolutions for the protection of children in armed conflict while actively participating in the revision of standards at the diplomatic level. During Germany's term as head of the UN Security Council in 2011/2012, the decision was made to also include militias and government armies responsible for attacks on hos-


CASES OF GRAVE ABUSES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS CONCLUSIVELY VERIFIED BY THE UNITED NATIONS

Source: CAAC reports; Date: December 2018

KILLING AND MUTILATION	2005 - 2017	~ 83 000 including approx. 10,000 in each of 2016 and 2017 alone		
FORCED RECRUITMENT	2005 - 2017	56 140		
SEXUAL VIOLENCE	2017	900 plus many unreported cases		
KIDNAPPING	2005 - 2017	~ 16 000 including 1,600 in 2017 alone by al-Shabaab in Somalia		
ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS	2005 - 2017	15 890		
DENYING ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	2010- 2017	69 2010	1 014 2016	1 436 2017

DANGEROUS COUNTRIES FOR CHILDREN, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FOR CONFLICT COUNTRIES, AND ARMS EXPORTS

Sources: OECD, CIA Factbook, Campaign Against Arms Trade; Date: March 2019



pitals and schools in the Council's list of shame.⁷² The Federal Government is currently advocating for the empowerment of women and girls in conflict situations.⁷³ Despite this step in the right direction, there are still key standards and agreements regarding human rights and children's rights that the Federal Government has chosen not to sign or observe.

This includes the Straight-18 standard, which prohibits the recruitment of minors into armies and armed groups,⁷⁴ and ILO Convention No. 169 on the protection of indigenous peoples, who are generally left to the mercy of war and conflict. For a long time, the Federal Government sought to put the brakes on the Safe Schools Declaration, although it has since endorsed this commitment. The third International Congress for Safe Schools is set to take place in Spain in May 2019. The Federal Government could take this opportunity to demonstrate the concrete steps it has taken up to now as part of its commitment to the Declaration.⁷⁵

A critical analysis of the Federal Government's course of action is presented below, addressing existing political guidelines, financial engagement, and the focus on issues pertaining to education and arms exports.

POLITICAL GUIDELINES

The rights of children and young people have long since received far too little consideration with regard to the development of political government programmes for conflict management. This can be seen, for example, in the Federal Guidelines published in September 2017 titled "Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, Promoting Peace". These guidelines are the result of a debate conducted under the motto of "PeaceLab2016: Innovative Crisis Prevention!" and with broad participation from the spheres of politics, civil society, science, associations, and the economy. The guidelines prioritise crisis preven-

tion and describe in great detail how to approach each phase of a conflict and what the areas of activity and instruments for promoting peace are in the partner countries. The role of children and young people, however, is barely acknowledged. Concrete measures to empower them and enable them to assume an active role in long-term crisis prevention efforts, non-violent conflict management, and peace promotion are relegated to the margins. The national action plan to implement UN Resolution 1325 is another relevant political programme, with its purpose being to give women and girls a greater role in conflict management. Although women and girls are frequently referenced in the document, they are virtually always referred to as a unit ("women and girls") and almost never as the target group of a specific measure. At the same time, the action plan emphasises that boys must be part of the effort to dismantle violent gender role stereotypes.⁷⁶ However, this action plan also lacks a comprehensive conflict management policy focussed on children and young people.

For its part, BMZ has developed an action plan for the implementation of the rights of children and young people titled "Agents of Change". Its objective is to use various areas of focus and regional priorities to integrate the rights of children and young people into gov-

ernment projects for development cooperation, thereby strengthening the active role of children and young people. The action plan presents several projects and measures in the areas of "Peace, Security, Flight", "Protection from Violence and Discrimination", "Participation", and "Poverty and Nutrition" in the regions of Africa, MENA, Asia and Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. These projects and measures extend the opportunities and chances offered by German development cooperation to children in conflict situations. However, it is unclear whether the areas of activity and components of conflict management will systematically contribute to an overarching child rights strategy comprising concrete, feasible projects; similarly, there is a lack of clarity regarding what relationship the action plan has to other relevant guidelines issued by the ministry (e.g. Development Policy for Peace and Security) and other departments.

UN Resolution 2250 on the role of young people in peace processes (see inset on following page) along with a series of other UN resolutions regarding children's rights clearly define a normative operational framework that should be adopted as policy. Such a policy would be consistent with similar obligations from other relevant areas, for example the Compact for Young People in Humanitarian Action, which the Federal Government signed in 2016.⁷⁷

The Federal Government should develop a clear strategy to implement UN Resolution 2250 comprehensively and with sufficient financial resources. The progress study "The Missing Peace" could serve as a blueprint for this process.⁷⁸ This means that holistic, interdepartmental approaches need to be developed in accordance with the guidelines titled "Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, Promoting Peace", thus allowing relevant measures to be adopted from other schemes.

As Chancellor Merkel recently

emphasised at the Munich Security Conference, German defence spending is projected to grow from 1.18 to 1.5 percent of GDP between 2015 and 2024. Under current conditions, this would mean a jump from EUR 33 billion to approximately EUR 60 billion.⁷⁹ However, more money for defence alone will not bring about world peace, as the Chancellor also pointed out. Leaving aside the political considerations that come from linking the defence budget to the development budget as announced in the Coalition Agreement, such a rise in defence spending should be accompanied by a massive increase in funding for civil conflict management in order to offer young people in war and post-conflict situations opportunities and hope for the future while contributing to international security through development aid.

FINANCIAL ENGAGEMENT

On the international stage, the Federal Government is performing credibly in terms of crisis prevention and peace promotion. Between 2007 and 2016, Germany was the third-largest ODA donor in this field (2017: USD 548 million).⁸⁰ Furthermore, the Federal Foreign Office has a robust budget for humanitarian assistance and crisis prevention that now amounts to EUR 2 billion for 2019. Children and young people also benefit from these funds, though it is difficult to estimate how much help they ultimately receive because reporting is usually limited to global budgets and the budgets for individual initiatives and programmes. In addition, BMZ provided financial support amounting to USD 289 million to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 2018 (budget for 2019: USD 509 million). The main recipients are Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, all of which are suffering from conflicts of varying intensity.⁸¹

UN RESOLUTION 2250

01. Urges Member States to consider ways to increase inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all levels in local, national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict.

The Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (2015) acknowledges the central role played by young people in peace processes. Children and young people are to be empowered as agents of change with regard to long-term approaches to crisis prevention and non-violent conflict management while assuming a positive, active role in preventing and counteracting violent extremism. The Resolution

calls for political, financial, technical, and logistical support for the participation of young people in peace processes. It focusses on social and political movements as well as pro-peace and anti-conflict measures at the local and national levels that are led and implemented by young people and contribute to the development of more peaceful societies characterised by democratic and integrative governance.

Since 2016, BMZ has provided funds amounting to EUR 230 million to fight trauma and improve the mental health of children. In total, the Federal Government has paid out EUR 1.51 billion to UNICEF since 2015, noting that the organisation is especially active in conflict zones.⁸²

All in all, however, the Federal Government's strategy lacks the requisite interdepartmental transparency for empowering children and young people in the areas of conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, and peace promotion in (post-)conflict situations. Such transparency should apply to all German engagement in this important field;

by tracking these efforts and making them visible, it opens the door for further development.

MORE SUSTAINABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ON THE TOPIC OF CHILD SOLDIERS


The reintegration of former child soldiers is a key component of peace processes and should receive increased and more liable funding.⁸³ Between 2008 and 2017, Germany's annual ODA for preventing and demobilising child soldiers was quite modest, averaging at USD 1.06 mil-

8.5

BILLION USD IS EDUCATION FUNDING FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN CONFLICT COUNTRIES SHORT BY PER YEAR

GERMAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CHILD SOLDIERS (PREVENTION AND DEMOBILISATION)

In USD million; Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System; Date: January 2019



lion. However, the specific figure fluctuates significantly from year to year, suggesting that the corresponding programmes are not designed to be sustainable in the long term. In this regard, Germany is following an international trend that can be observed in many DAC countries and the G7, even if those fluctuations are less extreme on the whole.

It is difficult to assess whether this data properly reflects official development assistance in this field. For example, in response to a minor interpellation by the political party The Left on 19 January 2018, the Federal Government revealed that it is conducting measures related to peace promotion and the social and professional reintegration of former soldiers in South Sudan, DR Congo, the Philippines, Colombia, and Afghanistan – these measures are also

reaching child soldiers. This is in addition to projects in three countries in which civil war has been over for some time: reconciliation following the Khmer Rouge dictatorship in Cambodia and professional education for young people in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In total, the measures listed by the Federal Government amounted to a value of EUR 27.05 million.⁸⁴ It also listed the work of a high-level expert in Afghanistan on questions pertaining to education, consultation, and support for Afghanistan's defence and security forces related to UN Security Council Resolution 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict; this work contributed to the adoption of a strategy by the Afghan Government in December 2017 to protect children during armed conflict. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan also provided for the introduction of a

reporting and monitoring system to allow incidents involving the recruitment of minors or involving military violence against minors to be recognised, resolved, and penalised. Additional payments were made to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and humanitarian national funds for aid projects, with a particular focus on highly vulnerable groups. However, there is no way to quantify what percentage of this is going to children (child soldiers).⁸⁵ For its part, the Federal Foreign Office will be funding capacity building for Rwandan security forces to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers and to protect child soldiers during armed conflict beginning in 2019.

The above shows that while the Federal Government's various departments are actively addressing the

issue of child soldiers, a lack of transparency paired with unstable funding are making it difficult to take a long-term approach to the issue.

EDUCATION

In 2017, crises and conflicts⁸⁶ prevented 25 million children around the world from attending school and left around 75 million children in urgent need of help to gain access to education. Humanitarian assistance does not prioritise education enough. Only two percent of globally available funding goes toward education, resulting in an annual shortfall of around USD 8.5 billion.⁸⁷ Education should also be a key component of peace promotion. High-quality, conflict-sensitive approaches to education can greatly contribute to peace promotion and the creation of a safe environment.⁸⁸ Political priorities, lesson plans, materials, and teachers all play important roles in education.

Germany's coalition agreement lists education as one of the priorities for German development cooperation. Federal Development Minister Gerd Müller is seeking to invest 25 percent of the BMZ budget in formal and professional education in the long term. This is a necessary step in the right direction. Excluding costs for post-secondary scholarships in Germany, BMZ distributed approximately EUR 1 billion across the global education sector in 2017, which equates to almost twelve percent of BMZ's EUR 8.5 billion budget or four percent of total German ODA.⁸⁹ However, only ten percent (2016) of funding is being earmarked as financially crucial bilateral aid for elementary education. It is not immediately clear how highly education rates among the measures for transitional aid, i.e. the development of social infrastructure by BMZ.⁹⁰

BMZ funds a number of good, innovative education projects in conflict zones, as *terre des hommes* has experienced at first hand. As initiatives to fight the root causes of displacement

have gained traction in recent years, so the topic of education has been receiving more political attention as well, especially for Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region. Education is a practical priority for BMZ in ten partner countries, several of which are affected by conflict, including Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon. Overall, there is more funding available for supporting education in conflict and crisis areas, but binding targets for long-term sustainability are lacking.⁹¹

The Federal Government has traditionally prioritised bilateral development cooperation, which is why it has been reluctant to invest in multilateral funds, allotting only ten percent of expenditure in 2016, including multilateral funds that focus on children in conflict zones. Germany is a founding member of the Global Partnership for Education, to which the Federal Government provided 1.74 percent of the organisation's total contributions between 2005 and 2018. Since 2018, the Federal Government has paid EUR 18 million into the fund per year – a fifth of the EUR 100 million required according to the Global Campaign for Education (a civil society network including organisations in Germany). The Federal Government is also the third-largest donor to the Education Cannot Wait fund, which specialises in crisis and conflict situations; to date, it has donated EUR 31 million.⁹² The Global Campaign for Education recommends an annual investment of EUR 50 million.

60

PERCENT
OF ARMS EXPORTS
ARE NOT
GOING TO EU OR
NATO STATES

In light of the global need for education funding, BMZ should turn words into concrete action by significantly increasing the resources available for this purpose. Ten percent of all ODA funds should go towards elementary education, especially in conflict countries with particularly high dropout rates and children who have never been able to go to school.

Outside of BMZ, the issue of education is not yet being sufficiently represented in the budget lines for humanitarian assistance. In 2016, the Federal Government invested 1.4 percent of its humanitarian assistance in education projects. However, the Global Campaign for Education is calling for this figure to be increased to around eight percent in order to meet the existing need in conflict situations. The immense challenges that come with managing crises and conflicts mean that effective interdepartmental coordination and transparency are crucial for education development. For its part, the Federal Foreign Office must begin visibly promoting education.⁹³

ARMS EXPORTS

Germany is one of the five largest exporters of small arms,⁹⁴ one of the deadliest categories of weapons. They have been described by former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as the "weapons of mass destruction of the 21st century". They are relatively cheap, easy to procure, and simple to use, even for children. The UN Child Rights Committee has repeatedly pointed out that the availability of small arms favours the recruitment of child soldiers and is a prerequisite for their deployment. The Federal Government has declared its commitment to exerting more control over the distribution of small arms, including by ratifying the international Arms Trade Treaty of 2014 and through the introduction of the post-shipment inspection pilot programme in July 2015. Despite international efforts, Germany's monitoring system for

arms exports remains incomplete. The Federal Government follows the EU's definition of small arms, which actually excludes many kinds of small arms such as pistols and firearms developed for "civilian" purposes. This allows exports of these weapons to be governed not by the more restrictive War Weapons Control Act but rather by the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which permits the export of anything that is not explicitly forbidden. Many weapons that even children can use for the purpose of violence are not subject to approval for export and are therefore not inspected as weapons of war. It is time for the Federal Government to change its definition of small arms to more closely match UN standards, and to categorise pistols and civilian firearms as weapons of war. Munitions exports allowing the use of small arms at all are also a problem; there is virtually no official export data for munitions.

Effective end-use control is lacking as well. In 2015, the ability to conduct post-shipment inspections in conjunction with the country of destination was introduced, but the implementation of these measures is not legally binding. In the years since, only two inspectors have been hired and they have conducted three post-shipment inspections.⁹⁵ Under current conditions, effective end-use control is not possible.

Stricter regulations apply only to the export of weapons of war and armaments to so-called third-party countries, i.e. countries outside of NATO and the EU – at least on paper. In practice, however, they are similarly ineffective. In 2017, more than 60 percent of German arms exports went to third-party countries, including many conflict countries and countries with a record of grave human rights abuses, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Brazil. Without end-use control, durable and easily transportable small arms end up in conflict zones in great numbers time and time again. Examples include German G-36 assault rifles manufactured

by Heckler & Koch, which appeared in a part of Mexico not approved for export, and Walther and SIG Sauer pistols that were delivered to Colombia via the USA.⁹⁶

The Federal Government is cancelling out its efforts to improve the living situation of children in conflict zones through its arms export policy, which forms part of its foreign trade policy. The high level of economic pressure is evident from the efforts of the UK and France to convince the Federal Government to start exporting arms to Saudi Arabia again, as this affects other European businesses as well.⁹⁷

In her public speech at the Munich Security Conference, Chancellor Merkel remarked that a unified European defence policy should be complemented by unified guidelines on arms exports. Such guidelines would have to be based on Germany's higher standards rather than the lower standards of other EU countries in order to prevent even more German and European weapons from flooding into war and conflict regions.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY

The Federal Government is actively pursuing development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in various places in an attempt to moderate the effects of war and to support peace processes. However, making the world a more peaceful and livable place for children will require a much more comprehensive, better coordinated aid approach as well as a groundbreaking shift in political direction in favour of prioritising the protection of children during armed conflict. A crucial component here would be a systematic, controlled arms embargo for conflict regions. Any government that is serious about Agenda 2030's guiding principle of "leaving no one behind" and the commitments of Sustainable Development Goal 16 – "Peace, justice, and strong institutions" – must fulfil this obligation.

Abbreviations

AFDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BMEL	Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture
GNP	Gross national product
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DEVAL	German Institute for Development Evaluation
EU	European Union
EUTF	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
DC	Official development cooperation
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
G7	Group of the seven leading industrialised countries
G20	Group of the 20 leading industrialised and threshold countries
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Least-developed country
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SEWOH	One World – No Hunger special initiative
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA	Official development assistance
UN	United Nations
VENRO	Umbrella organisation of German non-governmental organisations active in development and humanitarian aid

01 Federal Finance Plan 2018–2022, p. 50: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/Abt_2/Finanzplan-2018-2022.pdf?__blob=publication-File&v=2

02 cf. World Poverty Clock: <https://world-poverty.io/> (accessed: 2019-03-21)

03 These are credit financed primarily with funds acquired by KfW on the capital market. They are offered to commercially viable projects at near-market rates but sufficiently reduced so that they also count as ODA. This provides an additional source for German ODA by incorporating market funds alongside budget funds. cf: https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_15_2018.pdf (pp. 20 et seqq., 2019-01-28)

04 OECD, 2016: Making Development Cooperation More Effective: 2016 Progress Report: <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/making-development-co-operation-more-effective>

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06 International Food Policy Research Institute, 2015: Global Nutrition Report 2015: Actions and Accountability to Advance Nutrition and Sustainable Development. Washington, DC, S. 146: <https://globalnutritionreport.org/reports/global-nutrition-report-2018/>

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08 IFPRI, 2013: Global Food Policy Report 2012: <http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2012-global-food-policy-report>

09 Development Initiatives, 2018: 2018 Global Nutrition Report: Shining a light to spur action on nutrition. Bristol, UK.

10 To improve the food security of the most vulnerable groups, partner governments should

END NOTES

also be supported through the creation or expansion of social security programmes, appropriate healthcare, and assistance for pregnant women, mothers, and their children. (Joachim von Braun, 2018: Innovations to Overcome the Increasingly Complex Problems of Hunger, ZEF Working Paper 167)

11 *ibid.*

12 Center for Development Research PARI Policy Brief No 6.: https://research4agrinovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ZEF_Policy_Brief_No-6_eng_web.pdf

13 ALNAP, 2015 and 2018: State of the Humanitarian System: <https://www.alnap.org/help-library/the-state-of-the-humanitarian-system-report-2015> and <https://sohs.alnap.org/help-library/the-state-of-the-humanitarian-system-2018-summary>

14 Wilkinson et.al 2018: Forecasting hazards, averting disasters: implementing forecast-based early action at scale <https://www.odi.org/publications/11069-forecasting-hazards-averting-disasters-implementing-forecast-based-early-action-scale> -> Chapter 6, especially Box 4

15 OECD, 2018 States of Fragility Index 2018: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2018-9789264302075-en.htm>

16 *ibid.*

17 The Global Hunger Index (GHI) value fell from 43.6 percent in 2000 to 29.4 percent in 2018. In consideration of the multidimensional nature of hunger, the GHI is calculated on the basis of four indicators: the percentage of caloric undernutrition among the population, the percentage of wasting among children under five years of age, the percentage of stunting among children under five years of age, and the mortality rate for children under five years of age. For more information, see Grebmer, K. et al., 2018: Global Hunger Index: Forced Migration and Hunger. Bonn and Dublin: Welthungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide (<https://www.globalhungerindex.org/pdf/en/2018.pdf>)

18 FAO, 2018: The State of Food Insecurity in the World, 2018: <http://www.fao.org/3/I9553EN/i9553en.pdf>

19 Global Humanitarian Overview 2019. In 2017/18, famine was declared in parts of South Sudan (phase 5 of the Integrated Phase Classification); people in Nigeria and Somalia were threatened by famine, i.e. a borderline hunger situation between phase 4 (emergency) and phase 5 (famine).

20 African Development Bank Group. African Economic Outlook 2018: https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN.pdf

21 For current analyses and predictions, see: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ 43-45/2018); Development in Africa; ISS Policy Brief African Futures. Key Trends to 2035: <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief105.pdf>

22 See the Federal Government's answers to minor interpellations by the parliamentary faction BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-Drs. 19/5353 and the FDP faction, BT-Drs 19/6066

23 See for example: https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/Countries/benin/Benin_policy_matrix_28%20fev.pdf

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- 56 Since early 2018, the AU has maintained a permanent diplomatic mission in Beijing with the support of the Chinese government. See: <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180902/communiq%C3%A9-participation-chairperson-commission-focac-summit>
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- 58 The new mandate of AUDA has not been published but has been provided to Welthungerhilfe.
- 59 cf. Dr. Ibrahim Mayaki, CEO NEPAD, Interview with ISS, 24 May 2018.
- 60 Participants in Burkina Faso: SOS Sahel; Ligue des Consommateurs; FIAN; WANEP; Centre d’ Études et de Recherches sur le Droit International Général et les Droits de l’ Homme (CERDIH); Confédération Paysanne du Faso; INERA; participants in Ethiopia: AFSA; Oxfam UK; GOAL; HUNDEE; Forum for Social Studies (FSS); Action for Development (AFD); Guts Agro Industry, PLC; CDI.
- 61 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Afrika und Europa – Neue Partnerschaft für Entwicklung, Frieden und Zukunft, Eckpunkte für einen Marshallplan mit Afrika”, January 2017, https://www.bmz.de/de/laender_regionen/marshallplan_mit_afrika/index.jsp.
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- 64 “Armed conflict or organised violence”, <https://www.youth4peace.info/system/files/2018-10/youth-web-english.pdf>, p. 12
- 65 cf. https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/content/dam/global/reports/education-and-child-protection/war_on_children-web.pdf, p. 19
- 66 Freely translated based on Eglantyne Jebb, founder of Save the Children.
- 67 Report of the UN Secretary-General, 2018: Children and armed conflict: <http://undocs.org/s/2018/465>, p. 2
- 68 See UNICEF press release dated 2017-08-18: <https://www.unicef.de/informieren/aktuelles/presse/2017/welttag-humanitaere-hilfe-unicef/148308>
- 69 Save the Children, 2018: The war on children, pp. 19–20.
- 70 cf. Miller, K. E., and A. Rasmussen, 2010: “War Exposure, Daily Stressors, and Mental Health in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings: Bridging the Divide between Trauma-Focused and Psychosocial Frameworks.” Journal of Social Medicine 70 (1): 7-16.
- 71 See UNFPA News, 2017: <https://www.unfpa.org/news/new-study-finds-child-marriage-rising-among-most-vulnerable-syrian-refugees>, <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/south-sudan/>, <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/themes/conflict-humanitarian-crises/x>, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/nov/30/young-rohingya-girls-bangladesh-compelled-marry-food-rations>
- 72 The list is published as part of the UN Secretary-General’s annual report on children in armed conflicts.
- 73 See website of Federal Foreign Office: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussepolitik/themen/menschenrechte/05-frauen/frauen-konfliktpraevention-node>
- 74 The German armed forces are increasingly recruiting underage girls and boys as soldiers; in 2017, a new record was set with 2,128 underage recruits.
- 75 See press release dated 2018-09-25: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/Sala-DePrensa/NotasdePrensa/Paginas/2018_NOTAS_P/20180925_NOTA089.aspx.
- 76 Federal action plan to implement UN SC Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security between 2017 and 2020, 2017: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/216940/dce24ab4dfc29f70fao88ed-5363fc479/aktionsplan1325-2017-2020-data.pdf>, pp. 8, 11 and 25.
- 77 See Compact for Young People in Humanitarian Action: <https://www.agenda-forhumanity.org/initiatives/3829>
- 78 UNFPA, 2018: The Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security, p. 12.
- 79 See <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-02/verteidigungspolitik-natoausgaben-bundeswehr>.
- 80 OEDC statistics: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>
- 81 The UNICEF Transparency Portal: <https://open.unicef.org/>
- 82 Answer of the Federal Government to the minor interpellation raised by representative Kai Gehring and others together with the faction BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, dated 2019-02-28: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/080/1908066.pdf>, p. 33.
- 83 cf. petition by World Vision: <https://www.worldvision.de/mitmachen/unsere-kampagnen/kein-kind-will-toeten#petitionswidget>
- 84 See written questions of German parliament (Bundestag): <https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/004/1900484.pdf>, p. 69f.
- 85 Answer of the Federal Government to the minor interpellation raised by representative Kai Gehring and others together with the faction BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, dated 2019-02-28: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/080/1908066.pdf>
- 86 UNICEF press release dated 2017-07-07: <https://www.unicef.de/informieren/aktuelles/presse/2017/bildung-muzoon-g2o/146058>
- 87 See info on website of Education Cannot Wait: <http://www.educationcannotwait.org/the-situation/>
- 88 See the manual titled “Be true not violent”, published by terre des hommes: www.peace-manual.org.
- 89 See donor tracker: <https://donortracker.org/germany/education>
- 90 See BMZ website: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/uebergangshilfe/index.html>
- 91 See: Bildung darf nicht warten. Analyse des deutschen Beitrags zur Förderung von Bildung in Krisen und Konflikten: <https://www.bildungskampagne.org/sites/default/files/download/Bildung%20darf%20nicht%20warten.pdf>
- 92 See press release by Education Cannot Wait: <http://www.educationcannotwait.org/government-of-germany-announces-15-million-euros-pledge-for-education-cannot-wait/>
- 93 Bildung darf nicht warten. Analyse des deutschen Beitrags zur Förderung von Bildung in Krisen und Konflikten: <https://www.bildungskampagne.org/sites/default/files/download/Bildung%20darf%20nicht%20warten.pdf>
- 94 It is also the fourth-largest exporter of large arms: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/fs_1903_at_2018_o.pdf. German arms exports were 13% higher between 2014 and 2018 than between 2009 and 2013.
- 95 Answer of the Federal Government to the minor interpellation raised by representative Sevim Dagdelen and others together with the party DIE LINKE, dated 2017-12-28: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/080/1908066.pdf>, p. 33.
- 2018: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP19/2382/238202.html>
- 96 TV documentary by Daniel Harrich: Waffen für die Welt Export außer Kontrolle, 2018: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=17&v=iJwd1_FLBlw
- 97 See Guardian website dated 2019-02-20: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/20/germany-resists-uk-plea-to-resume-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia>
- 98 CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_mde.html.
- 99 See website of Campaign Against Arms Trade: <https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/exportlicences-eu/licence.en.html?source=Germany>.

For some countries, exports to certain neighbouring countries involved in the conflict are included.

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